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n recent years, defense analysts in the United States have substantially revised 
their estimates of China’s missile prowess. A decade ago, most observers rated 
Beijing’s ballistic missiles as inaccurate, blunt weapons limited to terrorizing ci-
vilian populations. Today, the emerging consensus within the U.S. strategic com-
munity is that China’s arsenal can infl ict lethal harm with precision on a wide 
range of military targets, including ports and airfi elds. As a consequence, many 
observers have jettisoned previously sanguine net assessments that conferred de-
cisive, qualitative advantages to Taiwan in the cross-strait military balance. In-
deed, the debates on China’s coercive power and Taiwan’s apparent inability to 
resist such pressure have taken on a palpably fatalistic tone. 
A 2009 RAND monograph warns that China’s large, modern missile and air 
forces are likely to pose a virtually insurmountable challenge to Taiwanese and 
American efforts to command the air over the strait and the island. The authors 
of the report believe that massive ballistic-missile sal-
vos launched against Taiwan’s air bases would severely 
hamper Taipei’s ability to generate enough fi ghter sor-
ties to contest air superiority. They state: “As China’s 
ability to deliver accurate fi re across the strait grows, 
it is becoming increasingly diffi cult and soon may be 
impossible for the United States and Taiwan to protect 
the island’s military and civilian infrastructures from 
serious damage.”1 As a result, the authors observe, 
“China’s ability to suppress Taiwan and local U.S. air 
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bases with ballistic and cruise missiles seriously threatens the defense’s ability 
to maintain control of the air over the strait.”2 They further assert, “The United 
States can no longer be confi dent of winning the battle for the air in the air. 
This represents a dramatic change from the fi rst fi ve-plus decades of the China-
Taiwan confrontation.”3
An unclassifi ed Defense Intelligence Agency report assessing the state of Tai-
wan’s air defenses raises similar concerns. The study notes that Taiwanese fi ghter 
aircraft would be unable to take to the air in the absence of well-protected airfi eld 
runways, suggesting a major vulnerability to the island’s airpower. The agency 
further maintains that Taiwan’s capacity to endure missile attacks on runways 
and to repair them rapidly will determine the integrity of the island’s air-defense 
system.4 While the report withholds judgment on whether Taipei can maintain 
air superiority following Chinese missile strikes in a confl ict scenario, a key con-
stituent of the U.S. intelligence community clearly recognizes a growing danger 
to Taiwan’s defense. 
China’s missiles also threaten Taiwan’s ability to defend itself at sea. William 
Murray contends that China could sink or severely damage many of Taiwan’s 
warships docked at naval piers with salvos of ballistic missiles. He argues that “the 
Second Artillery’s [China’s strategic missile command’s] expanding inventory of 
increasingly accurate [short-range ballistic missiles] probably allows Beijing to 
incapacitate much of Taiwan’s navy and to ground or destroy large portions of 
the air force in a surprise missile assault and follow-on barrages.”5 These are stark, 
sobering conclusions. 
Equally troubling is growing evidence that China has turned its attention to Ja-
pan, home to some of the largest naval and air bases in the world. Beijing has long 
worried about Tokyo’s potential role in a cross-strait confl agration. In particular, 
Chinese analysts chafe at the apparent American freedom to use the Japanese ar-
chipelago as a springboard to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. In the past, China 
kept silent on what the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would do in response to 
Japanese logistical support of U.S. military operations. Recent PLA publications, 
in contrast, suggest that the logic of missile coercion against Taiwan could be read-
ily applied to U.S. forward presence in Japan. The writings convey a high degree 
of confi dence that China’s missile forces could compel Tokyo to limit American 
use of naval bases while selectively destroying key facilities on those bases. These 
doctrinal developments demand close attention from Washington and Tokyo, lest 
the transpacifi c alliance be caught fl at-footed in a future crisis with Beijing. This 
article is a fi rst step toward better understanding how the Chinese evaluate the ef-
fi cacy of missile coercion against American military targets in Japan. 
This article focuses narrowly on Chinese assessments of U.S. naval bases in 
Japan, excluding the literature on such other key locations as the Kadena and 
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Misawa air bases. The writings on the American naval presence are abundant and 
far more extensive than studies on the land and air components of U.S. basing ar-
rangements. The dispatch of two carrier battle groups to Taiwan’s vicinity during 
the 1996 cross-strait crisis stimulated Beijing’s reevaluation of its military strat-
egy toward the island. Not surprisingly, the Chinese are obsessed with the U.S. 
aircraft carrier, including the facilities and bases that support its operations. It is 
against this rich milieu that this study explores how the Chinese conceive their 
missile strategy to complicate American use of military bases along the Japanese 
archipelago. 
This article fi rst explores the reasons behind Beijing’s interest in regional bases 
and surveys the Chinese literature on the U.S. naval presence in Japan to illus-
trate the amount of attention being devoted to the structure of American mili-
tary power in Asia. Chinese analysts see U.S. dependence on a few locations for 
power projection as a major vulnerability. Second, it turns to Chinese doctrinal 
publications, which furnish astonishing details as to how the PLA might employ 
ballistic missiles to complicate or deny U.S. use of Japanese port facilities. Chi-
nese defense planners place substantial faith in the coercive value of missile tac-
tics. Third, the article assesses China’s conventional theater ballistic missiles that 
would be employed against U.S. regional bases. Fourth, it critiques the Chinese 
writings, highlighting some faulty assumptions about the anticipated effects of 
missile coercion. Finally, the study identifi es some key operational dilemmas that 
the U.S.-Japanese alliance would likely encounter in a PLA missile campaign. 
EXPLAINING CHINA’S INTEREST IN REGIONAL BASES
Taiwan remains the animating force behind China’s strategic calculus with respect 
to regional bases in Asia. Beijing’s inability to respond to the display of U.S. naval 
power at the height of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis proved highly embarrassing. 
There is evidence that the PLA had diffi culty in monitoring the movement of the 
two carrier battle groups, much less in offering its civilian leaders credible mili-
tary options in response to the carrier presence. This galling experience steeled 
Beijing’s resolve to preclude U.S. naval deployments near Taiwan in a future crisis. 
Notably, the Yokosuka-based USS Independence (CV 62) was the fi rst carrier to 
arrive at the scene in March 1996, cementing Chinese expectations that Washing-
ton would dispatch a carrier from Japan in a contingency over Taiwan.
Beyond Taiwan, other territorial disputes along China’s nautical periphery 
could involve U.S. naval intervention. A military crisis arising from confl icting 
Sino-Japanese claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands northwest of Taiwan 
could compel an American reaction. While doubts linger in some Japanese policy 
circles as to whether foreign aggression against the islands would trigger Wash-
ington’s defense commitments as stipulated by the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, 
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joint allied exercises and war games since 2006 suggest that the U.S. military is 
closely watching events in the East China Sea. Farther south, Chinese territorial 
claims over large swaths of the South China Sea could also be sources of regional 
tensions. If a local tussle there escalated into a larger confl agration that threatened 
international shipping, the U.S. Navy might be ordered to maintain freedom of 
navigation. In both scenarios, the U.S. carrier based in Japan and other strike 
groups operating near Asian waters would be called upon as fi rst responders.
Concrete territorial disputes that have roiled Asian stability are not the only 
reasons that American naval power would sortie from regional bases to the detri-
ment of Chinese interests. More abstract and esoteric dynamics may be at work. 
For example, Chinese leaders fret about the so-called Malacca dilemma. China’s 
heavy dependence on seaborne energy supplies that transit the Malacca Strait has 
set off Chinese speculation that the United States might seek to blockade that 
maritime choke point to coerce Beijing.6 This insecurity stems less from judg-
ments about the possibility or feasibility of such a naval blockade than from the 
belief that a great power like China should not entrust its energy security to the 
fi ckle goodwill of the United States. If the U.S. Navy were ever called upon to 
fulfi ll an undertaking of such magnitude, forward basing in Asia would undoubt-
edly play a pivotal role in sustaining what could deteriorate into a protracted 
blockade operation.
Chinese analysts have also expressed a broader dissatisfaction with America’s 
self-appointed role as the guardian of the seas. Sea-power advocates have vigor-
ously pushed for a more expansive view of China’s prerogatives along the mari-
time periphery of the mainland. They bristle at the U.S. Navy’s apparent pre-
sumption of the right to command any parcel of the ocean on earth, including 
areas that China considers its own nautical preserves. Some take issue with the 
2007 U.S. maritime strategy, a policy document that baldly states, “We will be able 
to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends 
and allies, but by ourselves if we must.”7 Lu Rude, a former professor at Dalian 
Naval Academy, cites this passage as evidence of U.S. “hegemonic thinking.” He 
concludes, “Clearly, what is behind ‘cooperation’ is America’s interests, having 
‘partners or the participation of allies’ likewise serves America’s global interests.”8 
Some Chinese, then, object to the very purpose of U.S. sea power in Asia, which 
relies on a constellation of regional bases for its effects to be felt (see map).  
Long-standing regional fl ash points and domestic expectations of a more as-
sertive China as it goes to sea suggest that Beijing’s grudging acceptance of U.S. 
forward presence could be eroding even more quickly than once thought. Against 
this backdrop of increasing Chinese ambivalence toward American naval power, 
U.S. basing arrangements in Japan have come into sharper focus. 
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CHINESE VIEWS OF U.S. 
NAVAL BASES IN JAPAN
Some Chinese strategists appraise 
Washington’s military posture in 
the Asia-Pacifi c region in stark 
geopolitical terms. Applying the 
“defense perimeter of the Pacifi c” 
logic elaborated by Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson in the early 
Cold War, they see their na -
tion enclosed by concentric, lay-
ered “island chains.” The United 
States and its allies, they argue, 
can encircle China or blockade 
the Chinese mainland from is-
land strongholds, where power-
ful naval expeditionary forces are 
based. Analysts who take such a 
view conceive of the island chains 
in various ways. 
Yu Yang and Qi Xiaodong, for 
example, describe U.S. basing ar-
chitecture in Asia as a “three line 
confi guration [三线配置].”9 The 
fi rst line stretches in a sweeping 
arc from Japan and South Korea to 
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, 
forming a “zone of forward bases[前沿基地带].” This broad notion that the 
U.S. presence in the western Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean constitutes a seamless, 
interlocking set of bases is widely shared in Chinese strategic circles.10 The second 
line connects Guam and Australia. The last line of bases runs north from Hawaii 
through Midway to the Aleutians, terminating at Alaska. While these island chains 
may bear little resemblance to actual U.S. thinking and planning, that the Chinese 
pay such attention to the geographic structure of American power in Asia is quite 
notable. These observers discern a cluster of mutually supporting bases, ports, 
and access points along these island chains. Among the networks of bases in the 
western Pacifi c, those located on the Japanese archipelago—the northern anchor 
of the fi rst island chain—stand out, for the Chinese. Modern Navy, a monthly 
journal published by the Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army 
Yokosuka
Sasebo
Maizuru
Kure
Kadena
Misawa
CSS-6 (DF-15) SRBM
600 km range
CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBM
1,750 km range
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Navy, produced a seven-part series on Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force in 
2004 and 2005. Notably, it devoted an entire article to Japan’s main naval bases, 
including Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, and Maizuru.11 The depth of the coverage of 
these bases is rather remarkable, especially when compared to the sparse report-
ing on similar topics in the United States and in Japan. 
Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosu-
ka, which analysts portray as the centerpiece of U.S. basing in Asia.12 One analy-
sis depicts a “Northeast Asian base group [东北亚基地群]” radiating outward 
from Yokosuka to Sasebo, Pusan, and Chinhae.13 Writers provide a wide range 
of details about the Yokosuka naval base, including its precise location, the sur-
rounding geography, the number of piers (particularly those suitable for aircraft 
carriers), the types and number of maintenance facilities, and the storage capac-
ity of munitions, fuel, and other supply depots.14 Wu Jian, for instance, fi nds the 
geographic features of Yokosuka comparable to those of Dalian, a major base of 
the Chinese navy’s North Sea Fleet.15 
Beyond physical similarities, Yokosuka evokes unpleasant memories for the 
Chinese. One commentator recalls the U.S. transfer of 203 mm heavy artillery 
from Yokosuka to Nationalist forces on Jinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait 
crisis.16 Tracking more recent events, another observer notes that the Kitty Hawk 
Strike Group’s deployments from Yokosuka to waters near Taiwan invariably co-
incided with the presidential elections on the island, in 2000, 2004, and 2008.17 
As Pei Huai opines, “Yokosuka has all along irritated the nerves of the Chinese 
people.”18 Moreover, Chinese analysts are keenly aware of Yokosuka’s strategic po-
sition. As Du Chaoping asserts: 
Yokosuka is the U.S. Navy’s main strategic point of concentration and deployment in 
the Far East and is the ideal American stronghold for employing maritime forces in 
the Western Pacifi c and the Indian Ocean regions. A carrier deployed there is akin to 
the sharpest dagger sheathed in the Western Pacifi c by the U.S. Navy. It can control 
the East Asian mainland to the west and it can enter the Indian Ocean to the south-
west to secure Malacca, Hormuz, and other important thoroughfares.19
Ma Haiyang concurs:
The Yokosuka base controls the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima and the sea 
and air transit routes in the Indian Ocean. As the key link in the “island chain,” it 
can support ground operations on the Korean Peninsula and naval operations in the 
Western Pacifi c. It can support combat in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions 
while monitoring and controlling the wide sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Its strategic 
position is extremely important.20
It is notable that both Du and Ma conceive of Yokosuka as a central hub that tight-
ly links the Pacifi c and Indian oceans into an integrated theater of operations. 
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Intriguingly, some Chinese commentators view Yokosuka as the front line of 
the U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation on missile defense. They worry that Aegis-
equipped destroyers armed with ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems based 
in Yokosuka could erode China’s nuclear deterrent. Indeed, analysts see concen-
trations of sea-based BMD capabilities falling roughly along the three island 
chains described above. Ren Dexin describes Yokosuka as the fi rst line of defense 
against ballistic missiles, while Pearl Harbor and San Diego provide additional 
layers.21 Yokosuka is evocatively portrayed as the “forward battlefi eld position” 
(前沿阵地), the indispensable vanguard for the sea-based BMD architecture.22 
For some Chinese, these concentric rings or picket lines of sea power appear tai-
lored specifi cally to bring down ballistic missiles fi red across the Pacifi c from lo-
cations as diverse as the Korean Peninsula, mainland China, India, or even Iran.23 
Specifi cally, Aegis ships in Yokosuka, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego would be po-
sitioned to shoot down missiles in their boost, midcourse, and terminal phases, 
respectively.24 
Chinese observers pay special attention to Aegis deployments along the fi rst is-
land chain. Some believe that Aegis ships operating in the Yellow, East, and South 
China seas would be able to monitor the launch of any long-range ballistic mis-
sile deployed in China’s interior and perhaps to intercept the vehicle in its boost 
phase. Dai Yanli warns, “Clearly, if Aegis systems are successfully deployed around 
China’s periphery, then there is the possibility that China’s ballistic missiles would 
be destroyed over their launch points.”25 Ji Yanli, of the Beijing Aerospace Long 
March Scientifi c and Technical Information Institute, concurs: “If such [sea-
based BMD] systems begin deployment in areas such as Japan or Taiwan, the 
effectiveness of China’s strategic power and theater ballistic-missile capabilities 
would weaken tremendously, severely threatening national security.”26 Somewhat 
problematically, the authors seemingly assume that Beijing would risk its strate-
gic forces by deploying them closer to shore, and they forecast a far more capable 
Aegis fl eet than is technically possible in the near term. 
The indispensability of the ship-repair and maintenance facilities at Yoko-
suka emerges as another common theme in the Chinese literature. Analysts in 
China often note that Yokosuka is the only base west of Hawaii that possesses the 
wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. Some have concluded that Yoko-
suka is irreplaceable as long as alternative sites for a large repair station remain 
unavailable. Li Daguang, a professor at China’s National Defense University and 
a frequent commentator on naval affairs, casts doubt on Guam as a potential can-
didate, observing that the island lacks the basic infrastructure and economies of 
scale to service carriers.27 China’s Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships) 
published a translated article from a Japanese military journal, Gunji Kenkyu 
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(Japan Military Review), to illustrate the physical limits of Guam as a permanent 
home port for carriers.28 
Chinese analysts also closely examine Sasebo, the second-largest naval base 
in Japan. Various commentators call attention to its strategic position near key 
sea-lanes and its proximity to China.29 As Yu Fan notes, “This base is a large-scale 
naval base closest to our country. Positioned at the intersection of the Yellow Sea, 
the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan, it guards the southern mouth of the 
Korea Strait. This has very important implications for controlling the nexus of 
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan and for blockading the 
Korea Strait.”30 
It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists recognize the importance of U.S. naval 
bases in Japan for fulfi lling a range of regional and extraregional responsibilities. 
Indeed, some believe that the American strategic position in Asia hinges entirely 
on ready military access to bases on the Japanese islands. Tian Wu argues that 
without bases in Japan, U.S. forces would have to fall back to Guam or Hawaii. 
Tian bluntly asserts:
If the U.S. military was ever forced to withdraw from Okinawa and Japan, then it 
would be compelled to retreat thousands of kilometers to set up defenses on the sec-
ond island chain. Not only would it lose tremendous strategic defensive depth, but it 
would also lose the advantageous conditions for conducting littoral operations along 
the East Asian mainland while losing an important strategic relay station to support 
operations in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East through the South China Sea.31
This emerging discourse offers several clues about Beijing’s calculus in regard 
to U.S. naval basing arrangements in Japan. Chinese strategists see these bases as 
collectively representing both a threat to Chinese interests and a critical vulner-
ability for the United States. Bases in Japan are the most likely locations from 
which the United States would sortie sea power in response to a contingency over 
Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese are acutely aware of the apparent Ameri-
can dependence on a few bases to project power. Should access to and use of 
these bases be denied for political or military reasons, they reason, Washington’s 
regional strategy could quickly unravel. While the commentaries documented 
above are by no means authoritative in the offi cial sense, they are clearly designed 
to underscore the strategic value and the precariousness of U.S. forward presence 
in Japan. 
U.S. BASES IN JAPAN AND CHINESE MISSILE STRATEGY
Authoritative PLA documents correlate with this emerging consensus that U.S. 
bases on the Japanese home islands merit close attention in strategic and opera-
tional terms. Indeed, Chinese doctrinal writings clearly indicate that the American 
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presence in Japan would likely be the subject of attack if the United States were 
to intervene in a cross-strait confl ict. The unprecedented public availability of 
primary sources in China in recent years has opened a window onto Chinese 
strategic thought, revealing a genuinely competitive intellectual environment 
that has substantially advanced Chinese debates on military affairs. This growing 
literature has also improved the West’s understanding of the PLA. 
In an effort to maximize this new openness in China, this article draws upon 
publications closely affi liated with the PLA, including those of the prestigious 
Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University, that address 
coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia.32 Some are widely cited among 
Western military analysts as authoritative works that refl ect current PLA thinking. 
Some likely enjoy offi cial sanction as doctrinal guidance or educational material 
for senior military commanders. The authors of the studies are high-ranking PLA 
offi cers who are either leading thinkers in strategic affairs and military operations 
or boast substantial operational and command experience. These works, then, 
collectively provide a sound starting point for examining how regional bases in 
Asia might fi t into Chinese war planning. 
Among this literature, The Science of Military Strategy stands out in Western 
strategic circles as an authoritative PLA publication. The authors, Peng Guangqian 
and Yao Youzhi, advocate an indirect approach to fi ghting and prevailing against 
a superior adversary in “future local wars under high-technology conditions.”33 
To win, the PLA must seek to avoid or bypass the powerful fi eld forces of the ene-
my while attacking directly the vulnerable rear echelons and command structures 
that support frontline units. Using the human body as an evocative metaphor for 
the adversary, Peng and Yao argue, “As compared with dismembering the enemy’s 
body step by step, destroying his brain and central nerve system is more meaning-
ful for speeding up the course of the war.”34 To them, the brain and the central 
nervous system of a war machine are those principal directing and coordinating 
elements without which the fi ghting forces wither or collapse. 
The aim, then, is to conduct offensive operations against the primary sources 
of the enemy’s military power, what the authors term the “operational system.” 
They declare, “After launching the war, we should try our best to fi ght against 
the enemy as far away as possible, to lead the war to enemy’s operational base, 
even to his source of war, and to actively strike all the effective strength forming 
the enemy’s war system.”35 In their view, operational systems that manage com-
mand and control and logistics (satellites, bases, etc.), are the primary targets; 
they relegate tactical platforms that deliver fi repower (warships, fi ghters, etc.) to 
a secondary status. To illustrate the effects of striking the source of the enemy’s 
fi ghting power, Peng and Yao further argue:
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To shake the stability of enemy’s war system so as to paralyze his war capabilities has 
already become the core of the contest between the two sides in the modern high-
tech local war. So, more attention should be paid to striking crushing blows against 
the enemy’s structure of the operational system . . . especially those vulnerable points 
which are not easy to be replaced or revived, so as to make the enemy’s operational 
system seriously unbalanced and lose initiative in uncontrollable disorder.36
The authors are remarkably candid about what constitutes the enemy’s opera-
tional system. Particularly relevant to this study is their assertion that the supply 
system emerges as a primary target: 
The future operational center of gravity should not be placed on the direct confron-
tation with the enemy’s assault systems. We should persist in taking the information 
system and support system as the targets of fi rst choice throughout. . . . In regard to the 
supply system, we should try our best to strike the enemy on the ground, cut the 
material fl ow of his effi cacy sources so as to achieve the effect of taking away the 
fi rewood from the caldron.37 
Destruction of the supply system in effect asphyxiates the adversary. In order 
to choke off the enemy’s capacity to wage war, Peng and Yao contend, a “large part 
of the supply systems must be destroyed.”38 Their prescriptions for winning local 
high-tech wars suggest that the horizontal escalation of a confl ict to U.S. regional 
bases in Asia is entirely thinkable. Even more troubling, some Chinese appear 
to envision the application of substantial fi repower to pummel the U.S. forward 
presence. While The Science of Military Strategy should not be treated as offi cial 
strategic guidance to the PLA, its conceptions of future confl ict with a techno-
logically superior adversary provide a useful framework for thinking about what 
a Chinese missile campaign against regional bases might entail. 
There is substantial evidence in Chinese doctrinal writings that PLA defense 
planners anticipate the possibility of a sizable geographic expansion of the target 
set, to include U.S. forward presence in East Asia. Although the documents do not 
explicitly refer to naval bases in Japan, they depict scenarios strongly suggesting 
that Yokosuka is a primary target. In the hypothetical contingencies posited in 
these writings, U.S. intervention is a critical premise, if not a given. In particular, 
Chinese planners expect Washington to order the deployment of carrier strike 
groups near China’s coast, a prospect that deeply vexes Beijing. It is in this con-
text of a highly stressful (though by no means inconceivable) scenario that U.S. 
military bases come into play in Chinese operational thinking.
For PLA planners, the primary aims are to deter, disrupt, or disable the em-
ployment of carriers at the point of origin, namely, the bases from which carriers 
would sortie. Given the limited capability, range, and survivability of China’s air 
and sea power, most studies foresee the extensive use of long-range conventional 
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ballistic missiles to achieve key operational objectives against U.S. forward pres-
ence. In Intimidation Warfare, Zhao Xijun proposes several novel missile tactics 
that could be employed to deter the use of naval bases in times of crisis or war.39 
Zhao proposes demonstration shots into sea areas near the enemy state to compel 
the opponent to back down. Zhao explains, “Close-in (near border) intimidation 
strikes involve fi ring ballistic missiles near enemy vessels or enemy states (or in 
areas and sea areas of enemy-occupied islands). It is a method designed to induce 
the enemy to feel that it would suffer an unbearable setback if it stubbornly pur-
sues an objective, and thus abandons certain actions.”40 
One tactic that Zhao calls a “pincer, close-in intimidation strike” is particularly 
relevant to missile options against U.S. military bases. Zhao elaborates: “Pincer 
close-in intimidation strikes entail the fi ring of ballistic missiles into the sea areas 
(or land areas) near at least two important targets on enemy-occupied islands (or 
in enemy states). This enveloping attack, striking the enemy’s head and tail such 
that the enemy’s attention is pulled in both directions, would generate tremen-
dous psychological shock.”41 Zhao also proposes an “island over-fl ight attack” as 
a variation of the pincer strike. He states:
For high-intensity intimidation against an entrenched enemy on an island, an island 
over-fl ight attack employs conventional ballistic missiles with longer range and 
superior penetration capabilities to pass over the enemy’s important cities and other 
strategic targets to induce the enemy to sense psychologically that a calamity will 
descend from the sky. This method could produce unexpected effects.42 
While these missile tactics are primarily aimed at coercing Taiwan, they could 
also, in theory, be applied to any island nation. Reminiscent of the 1996 cross-
strait crisis, the PLA could splash single or multiple ballistic missiles into waters 
near Yokosuka (shot across Honshu Island, over major metropolitan cities) in the 
hopes that an intimidated leadership in Tokyo would stay out of a contingency 
over Taiwan, deny American access to military facilities, or restrict U.S. use of 
naval bases in Japan. 
Should deterrence through intimidation fail, the Chinese may seek to compli-
cate U.S. naval operations originating from bases located in the Japanese home 
islands. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, the most authoritative work 
on the PLA’s strategic rocket forces, furnishes astonishingly vivid details on the 
conditions under which China might seek to conduct conventional missile oper-
ations against outside intervention.43 Notably, the document explores “fi repower 
harassment” as a potentially effective tactic to resist external interference. Given 
its explicit references to the U.S. use of military bases on foreign soil, a passage on 
harassment strikes is worth quoting in its entirety:
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When the powerful enemy uses allied military bases in our periphery and aircraft 
carriers as aircraft launch platforms to implement various forms of military interven-
tion; and when the powerful enemy’s allied military bases around our periphery are 
beyond our air arm’s fi ring range, and when the carrier battle groups are far away 
from our shores, thus making it diffi cult to carry out the overall operational advan-
tages associated with fi repower coordination among the armed services and service 
arms, conventional missiles can be used to implement harassment strikes against the 
military bases of the enemy’s allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle 
groups.44
In other words, PLA planners intend to assign long-range strike missions to 
the ballistic missile force if warships, bombers, and submarines prove unable 
to reach enemy bases. Since U.S. bases in South Korea are well within reach of 
China’s short-range ballistic missiles, shore-based aircraft, surface combatants, 
and undersea fl eet, the “allied military bases” to which the study refers can only 
be those located in Japan. For the authors, harassment strikes might involve peri-
odic missile launches into “no go” zones erected near the naval bases, in order to 
“block the points of entry and exit to important enemy ports,” or they might en-
tail direct attacks against “key targets within the enemy ports, such as fueling and 
fuel loading facilities, and logistical supply facilities.”45 Such operations would be 
intended to disrupt seriously the resupply and movement of U.S. naval forces.
Beyond selective attacks, some Chinese analysts advocate highly destructive 
operations against U.S. military bases. In a study on the PLA’s blockade operations 
against Taiwan, Chinese defense planners entertain the possibility of signifi cant 
vertical and horizontal escalation to defeat U.S. intervention. The authors call for 
“opportune counterattacks” to defeat a carrier strike group engaged in combat 
operations against Chinese targets at sea, in the air, or on the mainland coast. In 
such a scenario, the PLA would do everything it could to successively weaken, 
isolate, and ultimately sink the carrier. In addition to lethal strikes against aircraft 
carriers, the authors envision concerted efforts to infl ict massive damage on the 
military bases supporting carrier operations. According to Zhu Aihua and Sun 
Longhai, “To punish the external enemy and to accommodate world opinion, it 
is not enough to sink the external enemy’s aircraft carrier. . . . It is necessary to 
destroy the springboard of combat operations, to pulverize the operational bases, 
to cut off the enemy’s retreat . . . in order to render obsolete hegemonism and 
power politics.”46 
It is clear, then, that Chinese strategists have systematically examined the strat-
egies, doctrines, and operational concepts for dissuading, disrupting, and deny-
ing the use of U.S. military bases along China’s periphery. These studies suggest 
that the PLA is prepared to calibrate the scale and magnitude of its military exer-
tions against American forward bases across a spectrum that includes deterrence, 
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compellance, and high-intensity confl ict. It is equally evident that an extension of 
missile operations to the Japanese homeland is well within the bounds of Chinese 
planning. Should circumstances warrant, the PLA may not hesitate to escalate a 
crisis or confl ict radically with missile salvos directed at Japan, to demonstrate 
political resolve, preclude Japanese involvement, or unhinge U.S. intervention.
U.S. BASES IN JAPAN AND CHINESE MISSILES 
A decade ago, Western analysts would have been on fi rm ground in dismissing 
such Chinese discussions about crippling U.S. regional bases as entirely wishful 
or even illusory. Indeed, they would have been justifi ed in questioning Beijing’s 
operational capacity to target U.S. bases in Japan even if it had possessed the will 
to do so. China simply could not have pulled off long-range, nonnuclear strikes 
beyond Taiwan. However, recent technical developments in the PLA’s ballistic-
missile forces suggest that China is already in a position to fulfi ll at least the more 
limited missions elaborated above. If the pace of Chinese missile acquisitions 
continues, over the next decade Beijing will likely boast a formidable arsenal to 
shape events along the entire fi rst island chain.
The Pentagon’s latest annual report to Congress on Chinese military power 
confi rms the doctrinal writings surveyed in this study. According to the Depart-
ment of Defense,
PRC military analysts have also concluded that logistics and mobilization are poten-
tial vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordi-
nating transportation, communications, and logistics networks. To threaten regional 
bases, logistics, and support infrastructure, China could employ SRBM/MRBMs 
[short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles], ground-launched LACMs 
[land-attack cruise missiles], special operations forces, and computer network attack 
(CNA).47
The report identifi es the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile as an operational 
weapon system that could reach any location along the Japanese archipelago. 
Concurring, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center states that “China is 
. . . acquiring new conventionally-armed MRBMs to conduct precision strikes at 
longer ranges. These systems are likely intended to hold at risk, or strike, logistics 
nodes and regional military bases including airfi elds and ports.”48
The exact size of the DF-21 force is not known in the public realm. The Pen-
tagon estimates that there are sixty to eighty DF-21 missiles and from seventy to 
ninety associated launchers in the PLA’s inventory.49 (The document does not 
distinguish between missiles armed with nuclear and conventional warheads.) 
The 2007 issue reports forty to fi fty missiles and between thirty-four and thirty-
eight launchers; the most recent report, therefore, represents a roughly 30 percent 
increase in two years.50 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat counts conventional 
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DF-21 launchers as numbering fewer than thirty.51 The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies claims that thirty-six nonnuclear DF-21s are deployed, in two 
brigades.52 Interestingly, this fi gure is a new entry in the 2010 issue of The Mili-
tary Balance; the previous tally lists only the nuclear variant, suggesting a much 
more rapid expansion of the conventional version than previously thought. Since 
the missile’s debut in the 1980s, the PLA has improved its accuracy, extended its 
range, and diversifi ed the types of warheads it can carry.53 This emerging arsenal 
will likely play an important role in holding at risk or attacking U.S. regional 
bases.54 
Several intervening factors are likely to infl uence the future size of the DF-21 
inventory. First, China needs to build an arsenal large enough to overwhelm the 
ballistic-missile defenses fi elded by the U.S.-Japanese alliance. As noted above, 
some Chinese analysts forecast a capable sea-based BMD system that could inter-
cept theater ballistic missiles. Chinese strategists would almost certainly have to 
take into account some level of attrition arising from successful missile intercep-
tions. Second, some of the more destructive coercive options could trigger U.S. 
horizontal escalation, including conventional counterforce strikes against Chi-
nese missile brigades on the mainland. Thus, strategists in Beijing must antici-
pate potentially severe losses should the United States expand its target set. These 
numerical factors suggest that the Second Artillery Corps will almost certainly 
need a much larger DF-21 missile force to engage in the types of high-intensity 
operations outlined in the doctrinal writings. 
Observers may object that capabilities do not refl ect intent. In other words, 
missile range, accuracy, payload, and force size by themselves constitute insuf-
fi cient evidence of exactly what Beijing plans to hit. Some may even fi nd it im-
plausible that China would attack a staunchly anti-nuclear-weapons state bound 
by a pacifi st constitution, even if some of its real estate is occupied by a foreign 
military power. Nevertheless, the historical pattern of Chinese missile deploy-
ments since the Cold War suggests that U.S. bases in Japan have always been pri-
mary targets for nuclear strikes. In the 1960s the PLA extended the range of its 
fi rst operational nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, the DF-2, to ensure that it could 
reach all American bases in Japan. Beijing deployed the follow-on missile, the DF-
3, near the North Korean border to cover targets on the Japanese home islands 
and Okinawa. If China had always intended to violate its negative security assur-
ances—that is, pledges not to attack nonnuclear third parties—with city-busting 
warheads, it should not be surprising that Beijing would fi eld conventional mis-
siles for use against Japanese territory. Indeed, the DF-21 may represent a far 
less “blunt” instrument than its predecessors did and offer a somewhat “surgical” 
option to Chinese defense planners.55 
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINESE MISSILE DOCTRINE
There are compelling reasons for the Chinese to consider vertical and horizontal 
escalation in coercive campaigns against regional bases in Asia. At the same time, 
the PLA’s missile force appears poised to extend its reach far beyond China’s im-
mediate periphery. The alignment of Chinese aspirations and capabilities will 
complicate crisis management and stability, escalation control, and war termina-
tion in the event of confl ict. The gaps in Chinese doctrinal writings offer reasons 
to worry about these complications. 
First, Chinese analysts seldom consider the mechanisms or chain of events that 
link the use of precision fi re with the intended operational effects the PLA hopes 
to achieve. Most discussions assume or assert with certitude that the employment 
of certain missile tactics would induce a predictable set of American responses. 
But closer examination suggests that strategists may have underrated the ability 
of U.S. naval forces to sustain operations under severe duress, thus oversimplify-
ing the action-reaction dynamic. For example, the wholesale destruction of fuel 
depots and logistical facilities would not likely have a direct or immediate impact 
on a carrier strike group either en route to or actively operating in a combat 
zone. The U.S. Navy could surge additional carriers into the theater of operations 
and rush at-sea-replenishment vessels from Guam, Hawaii, and San Diego to the 
scene. Such work-arounds would cushion a devastating blow against logistical fa-
cilities in Japan, enabling U.S. operations to continue unimpeded. Indeed, many 
frontline units would not feel the effects of infrastructure damage in Yokosuka 
or Sasebo for many weeks. In this scenario, China would likely have to settle in 
for a more protracted struggle. This potential outcome runs directly counter to 
the PLA’s long-standing preference for quick, decisive victories at the operational 
level of war.
Second, doctrinal publications exhort PLA commanders to maintain an of-
fensive spirit and to seize the initiative in the opening stages of a military cam-
paign. Indeed, Chinese analysts insist that China should make the fi rst move in 
any confl ict. A crushing initial blow would throw the enemy off balance, enabling 
the PLA to dictate the tempo of the war. As the Science of Second Artillery Cam-
paigns asserts,
To “strike the enemy at the fi rst opportunity” mainly refers to the need for the Second 
Artillery conventional missile force to act before the enemy, take the enemy by sur-
prise, and attack the enemy when it is unprepared during its operational activities. It 
should be used fi rst during the initial phase or at a certain stage of the campaign. . . . 
Therefore, in terms of campaign planning, it is necessary to launch attack before the 
enemy, strike fi rst, and maintain the offensive intensity until the victorious conclu-
sion of the campaign.56 
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More troubling, Chinese strategists foresee the preemptive use of conventional 
ballistic missiles against the enemy’s rear areas: 
Using its advantages of concealment and surprise, active and intelligent response, and 
powerful penetration capability the missile force implements preemptive strike against 
the enemy’s important in-depth targets. . . . Therefore, speedily striking the enemy, 
striving to seize the initiative, and avoiding losses are issues with which the campaign 
commander must fi rst be concerned. It is necessary to strike the enemy at the fi rst 
opportunity, before the enemy has discovered our campaign intentions and actions, sur-
prise the enemy, act before the enemy, strike rapidly, catch the enemy by surprise.57 
Given these operational parameters, the Chinese might conduct a bolt-from-
the-blue missile strike against vulnerable carriers and warships anchored and at 
pierside to knock out the U.S. Navy.58 An attack on a fl eet in port would be akin to 
strikes against fi xed targets. The impact—in terms of vessels sunk or damaged—
would be direct, immediate, and relatively easy to measure. The Imperial Japa-
nese Navy’s surprise attacks against the Russian fl eet at Port Arthur and the U.S. 
Pacifi c fl eet at Pearl Harbor illustrate the logic of such a bold move. 
From a strictly operational perspective, preemption is highly effi cacious. At the 
same time, Chinese planners acknowledge the need to balance tactical advantages 
against the potential international backlash arising from foreign perceptions that 
China had launched an unprovoked attack. PLA writings are acutely attuned to 
such moral and reputational considerations. Yet they offer no concrete guidance 
as to how to reconcile the emphasis on striking fi rst with the broader strategic 
factors that would likely hold back policy makers in Beijing, the fi nal arbiters 
of the weighty decision to order a surprise attack. This tension between opera-
tional expediency and political imperatives is left unresolved. A policy/strategy 
mismatch looms. 
It is entirely conceivable that even at the height of a major crisis Chinese de-
cision makers might recoil from the missile options presented to them. They 
could very well reject preemption out of hand as overly incendiary and politically 
counterproductive. A precedent in Sino-U.S. Cold War history is illustrative. Dur-
ing the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, American civilian leaders rejected the military’s 
planned nuclear riposte to Chinese provocations, on the grounds that massive 
retaliation was out of proportion to the confrontation at hand. President Dwight 
Eisenhower fi rmly declined to consider recommendations by the Pacifi c Air Force 
to order tactical nuclear strikes against Chinese troops massed near Xiamen.59 
Whether PLA commanders are suffi ciently attuned to national policy to antici-
pate similar civilian pushback or to appreciate the political rationales for restraint 
is unclear. 
Third, escalation control will be a severe challenge for Beijing. Chinese writ-
ings exhibit an awareness of escalation problems associated with missile coercion. 
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Analysts worry that misapplication of missile tactics could dramatically reshape 
the dynamics of the war, provoking greater exertions by the intervening power 
while widening the confl ict, drawing in additional third parties. As Zhao Xijun 
warns, “In conducting close-in intimidation strikes, one must maintain a cer-
tain distance from the enemy’s border (sea area) line and select highly accurate 
missiles to prevent them from falling into enemy territory (or enemy occupied 
islands) or directly hitting the enemy’s aircraft carrier owing to imprecision or 
loss of fl ight control.”60
Zhao acknowledges that accidents or miscalculations that cross the bounds 
of intimidation could transform the nature of the confl ict, to China’s detriment. 
Suffering direct harm could harden an enemy’s resolve substantially, immuniz-
ing him against subsequent attempts at intimidation. Concurring, The Science of 
Second Artillery Campaigns cautions, “Commanders should cautiously make de-
cisions, choose the appropriate opportunities, select high-precision missiles for 
precision strikes against key targets, and prevent missile fi repower from deviating 
from the targets and giving others the excuse to permit the third country’s par-
ticipation in the military intervention.”61 An errant ballistic missile destined for 
the Yokosuka naval base could very well plummet into densely populated civilian 
areas surrounding the base or a major city along its fl ight path. It is conceivable 
that an aggrieved Japan would punish China by refusing to limit (or even agree-
ing to expand) U.S. access to military bases on the home islands. Indeed, contin-
ued Japanese acquiescence to American use of military facilities might be enough 
to foil China’s strategy. 
But Beijing faces even more daunting challenges than the writings let on. Chi-
nese defense planners seem to assume that the Japanese leadership and the public 
would make a clear, objective distinction between targeted attacks against strictly 
military installations and wanton strikes against civilian population centers. Mis-
sile launches against Yokosuka would be an act of foreign aggression against the 
homeland unprecedented since the Second World War. It is hard to imagine the 
Japanese quibbling about the nature and intent of Chinese missile strikes under 
such circumstances; the strident Japanese response to North Korea’s Taepodong 
missile launch over the home islands in 1998 is a case in point. In other words, the 
escalatory pressures are far stronger than the Chinese writings assume. Intimida-
tion warfare will be neither clean nor straightforward. Indeed, it could unleash 
the forces of passion intrinsic to any war far beyond China’s control. 
More broadly, PLA planners seem excessively confi dent that certain missile 
tactics would accurately telegraph Beijing’s intentions. They assume that the pre-
cise application of fi repower could send clear, discrete signals to the adversary 
in times of crisis or war. A small dose of well-placed missiles, they seem to be-
lieve, might persuade the enemy to back down or to cease and desist. This line of 
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reasoning in part explains the counterintuitive logic that China could engage in 
escalation in order to compel its opponent to de-escalate. The logic is as beguiling 
as it is potentially misleading. Missiles are not fi nely tuned weapons for those on 
the receiving end. The adversary may perceive what is intended as a warning shot 
or demonstration of resolve as a prelude to an all-out attack and then overreact 
rather than pausing or acting with caution. The result for the Chinese could be 
unanticipated vertical or horizontal escalation, or both. 
Equally worrisome, operational interactions between Chinese and American 
forces could prove highly escalatory and destabilizing. As Evan Medeiros and co-
authors astutely observe, the operational doctrines on both sides share a procliv-
ity for seizing the initiative at the outset of a confl ict through surprise, speed, and 
attacks against enemy rear echelons. Medeiros further argues:
Neither body of doctrine appears to consider how an adversary might react to such 
operations in a limited war—indeed, each seems to assume that it will suppress 
enemy escalation by dominating the confl ict. Consequently a Sino-American con-
frontation would entail risks of inadvertent escalation if military forces were permit-
ted to operate in keeping with their doctrinal tenets without regard for escalation 
thresholds.62
It is clear, then, that an attack against regional bases is neither a trump card nor 
a substantially risk-free option. If plans go awry, as they always do in war, China 
could fi nd itself in a protracted confl ict against more than one implacable, well 
resourced enemy as intent as the Chinese upon achieving escalation dominance. 
Whether Beijing would fi nd the stakes over Taiwan or over another dispute suf-
fi ciently high to run such a risk is unclear. 
Disturbingly, however, Chinese writings suggest that some segments of the 
PLA are inclined to accept the repercussions of a coercive campaign against U.S. 
bases in Japan. What explains this cavalier attitude about escalation? First, these 
writings may be symptomatic of a broad underdevelopment in coercion and de-
terrence theory. Chinese strategic theoreticians may still be grappling with the 
power and options that long-range conventional missiles confer on China. Bei-
jing’s analytical efforts to harness new military capabilities hitherto unavailable to 
it may be analogous to the growing pains that U.S. strategic thought underwent 
in the early years of the nuclear revolution. Second, the absence of hard-won 
experience from modern warfare and crisis could account for optimism about 
escalation control. The Chinese have not fought a war for over thirty years, since 
the Sino-Vietnamese border confl ict. Moreover, China has not yet confronted 
sobering incidents (comparable to the Cuban missile crisis) against which to re-
assess and radically revise prevailing assumptions. In short, it is easy to succumb 
to logical fallacies when operating in a theoretical vacuum.
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Alternatively, Chinese overconfi dence in managing escalatory pressures could 
refl ect the lessons that defense planners learned from the cross-strait confron-
tation in 1996. Some analysts in China have unequivocally concluded that the 
missile tests deterred the island from the road to independence while signaling 
clear redlines to the United States.63 The notion that a limited number of missile 
launches could produce far-reaching success in coercive diplomacy is a seductive 
narrative likely to attract adherents within the Second Artillery Corps. Indeed, 
such an uncritical story line could reinforce preferences, biases, and faulty as-
sumptions underlying the discourse within the missile community. Troublingly, 
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns explicitly credits the missile tests in 
1995 and 1996 for generating multiple studies that “have fi lled in a blank in con-
ventional guided missile operation theories of the Second Artillery Corps.”64 A 
sample set comprising one case study is hardly a basis for universally applicable 
principles of war. 
Finally, the writings themselves may be a form of peacetime signaling. The 
studies clearly communicate to foreign audiences China’s willingness to gam-
ble in a big way in high-stakes disputes. If the doctrinal works convince outside 
powers that China may just be reckless enough to carry out the implied threats, 
they will have effectively cast a shadow of deterrence over potential adversaries. 
Mao Zedong’s cunning efforts to deprecate the power of nuclear weapons—by 
famously depicting atom bombs as “paper tigers”—in order to signal Chinese 
resolve are instructive. 
Any combination of these reasons should give pause to those inclined to dis-
miss the strategic signifi cance of the doctrinal writings. 
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
U.S.-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
Washington and Tokyo will encounter a more complex geometry of deterrence 
with the emergence of a robust Chinese theater-strike capability. The action-
reaction dynamic in the United States–Japan–China triangle will be far less 
straightforward than that of the alliance’s deterrent posture toward North Ko-
rea. The existential threat that U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority poses to 
Pyongyang is often presumed to be suffi cient to deter the North’s adventurism. 
Such is not the case with China. Boasting an increasingly survivable retaliatory 
nuclear strike complex, including a growing road-mobile strategic missile force 
and a nascent undersea deterrent, Beijing may be confi dent enough to conduct 
theater-level conventional missile operations under its protective nuclear umbrel-
la. The war scares in the South Asian subcontinent over the past decade suggest 
that nuclear-armed regional powers, less inhibited by fears of enemy nuclear co-
ercion or punishment, may feel emboldened to escalate a conventional confl ict.65 
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Japan and its many lucrative basing targets could well become a conventional, 
theater-level battlefi eld trapped between two nuclear-armed powers. 
Assuming that vertical escalation toward nuclear use can be contained, the 
alliance must still consider efforts at denying attempts to punish Japan. Allied 
missile defenses, as they are currently confi gured, will have great diffi culty cop-
ing with theater ballistic missiles like the DF-21. In the context of a cross-strait 
scenario, retired rear admiral Eric McVadon observes, “Being an MRBM with a 
much higher reentry velocity than SRBMs, the DF-21C is virtually invulnerable 
to any missile defenses Taiwan might contemplate.”66 While the alliance possess-
es a far more sophisticated, multilayered missile defense architecture than does 
Taipei, longer-range missiles pose similar stresses to the defense of Japan. If the 
missiles were fi red from launch sites in northeastern China, allied response times 
would be very compressed. Inexpensive techniques and countermeasures by the 
PLA, such as saturation tactics and decoys, could be employed to overwhelm or 
defeat missile defenses, which are designed for less sophisticated regional threats 
from North Korea and Iran. If the Second Artillery Corps launched successive 
missile salvos against the same strategic site, the alliance could quickly exhaust its 
ammunition, constraining its ability to defend other targets. 
Escalation control would also bedevil the alliance. One critical escalation 
threshold pertains to the initiation of hostilities were China to prepare for or 
launch its fi rst missile strike. The allies would be very hard-pressed to distinguish 
confi dently conventional missiles from nuclear-tipped missiles. Indeed, fi nding 
the missiles at all would be hard enough, since the road-mobile DF-21s would 
almost certainly disperse to a variety of concealed launch sites to diminish the 
threat of a disarming preemptive strike by enemy forces. To compound matters, 
Chinese conventional missiles might share the basing facilities with their nuclear 
counterparts. Space-based surveillance and reconnaissance would provide at best 
an incomplete picture of China’s wartime missile posture. In short, no one would 
know for sure whether a Chinese warhead hurtling toward Yokosuka was a nucle-
ar or a conventional weapon. The fog and friction that accompany any crisis or 
war would multiply this uncertainty. 
Would the alliance be willing to discount the possibility that the launch could 
be a nuclear strike? Or would it assume the worst? In the event of Chinese con-
ventional bombardment, what would be the appropriate military response from 
the United States? What might underlie and inform Japanese expectations of the 
U.S. reaction? Would the alliance be prepared to expand the war to the mainland? 
Would a besieged Japan demand more punitive strikes against China than the 
United States would be willing to infl ict? Would Tokyo lose confi dence in Wash-
ington if the latter refrained from what it considered disproportionate escalation? 
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What would be the consequences of such a breakdown in trust during and after 
the confl ict? These troubling questions make it imperative that Tokyo and Wash-
ington clearly recognize the operational temptations to overreact and the political 
consequences of underreaction. Though prudence calls for restraint, the stresses 
of crisis and war could radically skew rational calculations. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that theater-level interactions involving 
conventional missile strikes against regional bases could be highly unstable and 
prone to miscalculation on all sides. The apparent underdevelopment of Chinese 
doctrine on missile coercion, littered as it is with questionable assumptions about 
the adversary, could exacerbate this latent instability. In the meantime, it seems 
that the U.S.-Japanese alliance has not moved far beyond rudimentary discus-
sions of extended deterrence, a concept that does not fully capture the complexi-
ties of the emerging missile threat in Asia.67 It thus behooves Washington and 
Tokyo to anticipate a far more ambiguous and stressful operational environment 
than has been the case over the past two decades. The alliance must come to grips 
with the advances in Chinese thinking about coercive campaigns while explor-
ing options for hardening the partnership, both politically and militarily, against 
Beijing’s emerging missile strategy. 
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